Space Superiority is a core task for the USAF, critically enabling US combat operations. As the US becomes more reliant on space-based resources to ensure military and economic success, the need to protect them will increase. A robust space threat warning capability--the ability to detect, assess and respond to hostile actions against space assets--is the foundation for this protection.
Introduction
Space Superiority is a core task for the USAF, critically enabling US combat operations. As the US becomes more reliant on space-based resources to ensure military and economic success, the need to protect them will increase. A robust space threat warning capability-the ability to detect, assess and respond to hostile actions against friendly space assets--is the foundation for this protection.
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Leaders at the highest levels of the US government have stated that the United States must avoid a space Pearl Harbor.
2 Some of this concern is due to the idea that a decrease in the perceived threat to our space assets after the break up of the Soviet Union coupled with a competition for space resources has resulted in a corresponding erosion of US space threat warning and attack assessment capabilities.
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This paper describes the development and gradual erosion of US space defense threat warning capabilities, potential threats to US space assets, and discusses the implications to national security should the US fail to take corrective action. The paper concludes with actionable recommendations to close these gaps to ensure space does not become the location of our next "Pearl Harbor."
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Development and Erosion of US Space Hostile Threat Warning Capabilities
The words space and Pearl Harbor have been used together a number of times over the last 50 years to describe an actual or potential warning failure involving space systems. The first use in 1957 when with the Soviet Union put the first satellite, Sputnik I, in orbit. Nearly a month later, the Soviets followed up with Sputnik II. 5 These launches demonstrated the Soviets had an advanced satellite program and the booster technology sufficient to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles to deliver nuclear warheads from one continent to another. 6 The Sputnik program surprised the American public so much that it was described as having a "Pearl Harbor"
effect that dramatically changed American defense strategy to deal with emerging threats from Soviet bombers, long range missiles and orbiting space vehicles. 7 Generally, threat-based changes to warning and defense doctrine and the funding to operationalize it required a major catalyst to get the ball rolling. Between 1957 and 1960, the Commander-in-Chief, North American Air Defense Command (CINCNORAD), initiated the process to evaluate missile and space threats and warning requirements in response to the threat posed by the Sputnik launches. 8 This effort ratcheted up after Nikita Khruschev publicly asserted that Moscow possessed the technology to orbit a space vehicle and then land it on a specific target. 9 In response, the US cobbled together a baseline space surveillance radar system called the Space Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS). 10 In 1968, Khruschev's threat became a reality when the Soviet Union tested and fielded a Fractional Orbital Bombardment (FOB) System. The FOB System was designed to counter our missile warning radars by launching an ICBM into low Earth orbit and later de-orbiting the reentry vehicle and warhead over the South Pole for an attack opposite of where US radars were facing. 11 In 1969, the fielded version went on alert with nuclear devices. 12 In the space warning arena, this development left the US scrambling to field a southern facing radar screen and accelerated development of a space-based launch detection capability.
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From 1971 through the 1980s the Soviets upped the ante by testing and fielding a coorbital anti-satellite weapon (ASAT), ground-based high energy lasers, an anti-ballistic missile system with ASAT capabilities, and satellite jammers. 14 These threats pushed the Department of Defense (DoD) to continue work started in the 1960s by building a global space surveillance network of radar and optical sensors to maintain space situational awareness. The DoD located the hub of this network, the Space Surveillance Center and Space Defense Operations Center, inside Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado under the control of Air Defense Command.
To date, the high-water mark of US space defense capability probably occurred in the mid-1980s with the formal establishment of the Space Defense Operations Center (SPADOC) with a separate but supporting Space Surveillance Center (SSC). The SPADOC functioned as the sole "focal point for national space defense functions" serving as a fusion center for the space control mission responsible for protecting US and allied space systems. 15 To achieve its objectives, SPADOC monitored and reported unusual space activity, analyzed potential threat attack profiles, determined the time and location of the attack, and identified the space systems under attack as well as the method and type of attack taking place using operator inputs and surveillance data provided by its companion center, the SSC. 16 This arrangement identified a single point-of-contact for space anomaly reporting, assessment and threat warning which led to the development of a center of excellence for space defense while allowing the SSC to focus on providing space analysis products to support day-to-day space operations. The result was a welldocumented space threat warning process that was robustly trained, practiced and exercised during the many real-world new foreign space launches and anti-satellite weapons testing that occurred during the height of the Cold War. However, a number of events since that time have contributed to the fragmentation and erosion of this threat warning process.
The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1989, the cessation of anti-satellite weapons testing, the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty outlawing the use of FOB systems, and a reduction in the number of military space launches helped decrease the perceived threat to our space assets from attack. 17 In 1999, the Commander, US Space Command, General Richard B.
Myers, voiced his concern that the end of the Cold War shifted US priorities away from space defense and the tracking of anti-satellite threats to other DoD issues. 18 This decline in perceived space threat led to a gradual de-emphasis of the space defense mission which resulted in the diversion of personnel and consolidation of resources to other space mission areas, such as space surveillance support to day-to-day satellite operations, and theater space support.
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The 1994 consolidation of the Space Surveillance Center and the SPADOC into the Space Control Center (SCC) is a prime example of this shift. The new center no longer included the words "space defense" in its mission statement and gradually shifted away from contingencybased space defense and threat warning to a peacetime space surveillance support role.
This pattern continued after the migration of the SCC from US Space Command (USSPACECOM) control to the Air Force. 20 The intentional threat warning mission was still present but was overshadowed by the demand for more and better space surveillance support and the resources this required. A comparison of the mission statements prior to the mission migration to the SCC with the current focus of the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) highlights this change. In 1999, US Space Command identified the primary role of the SCC as:
Provides warning to United States' space system operators to protect their satellites from potentially hostile situations or dangerous natural events.
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This was the last mission statement that identified space threat warning as a priority.
Today, with the SCC integrated into the JSpOC, the focus is on the critical task of theater space support to the warfighter. The current JSpOC mission statement is:
Conduct operational-level space combat planning and direct space combat operations across the spectrum of conflict by planning, synchronizing, tasking, integrating, and assessing execution of assigned and attached worldwide space forces to accomplish STRATCOM UCP and theater space support missions.
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There is also pressure to distance the SCC from its Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) mission responsibility to focus more on space situational awareness.
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This trend, coupled with a planned move of the SCC out of Cheyenne Mountain to Vandenberg AFB, could move threat warning even farther back on the space priority list as the threat warning mission will not only compete with routine space surveillance tasks but also with additional theater space support and the production of the Space Tasking Order (STO).
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The promulgation of space operations centers in the form of system-specific satellite support centers, regional operations centers, and component-level operations centers has decreased the chances of important threat information flowing to a common threat assessment center. This is also exacerbated by the lack of clear-cut guidance and training on the space threat reporting process across the services. Part of this problem arises from the Unified Command
Plan changes that occurred after 9/11 that resulted in the stand down of USSPACECOM and the expansion of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to take control of previous USSPACECOM missions. 25 The final organizational structure for the command and control of space forces is still in the works. However, the Air Force and USSTRATCOM have transitioned back to the idea of a joint operations center manned by joint and inter-agency personnel to support the Air Force's Joint Warfighting Support Concept. 26 As part of this effort, the Air Force's space warfighting headquarters, the 14th Air Force, in conjunction with the USSTRATCOM Commander, Space and Global Strike, are consolidating functions within the JSpOC. 27 This is the organization that is currently tasked with executing the space threat warning and space control mission.
These events added to the gradual erosion of the US space defense mindset that led
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld to express concern that the US could become a victim of a "space Pearl Harbor". 28 The growing dependence on space capabilities by the US makes this event more likely and has serious national security implications. This is more disconcerting given incentives for other nations or non-state actors to target US space capabilities.
Hostile Intent
The US is not the only nation that recognizes the implications of current American space dominance. Today, there are no weapons in space; however, the growing US reliance on space for national security and the inherent vulnerability of space assets make them a prime target for potential attack by states like Russia and China, and well-organized terrorist groups or rogue states.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union aggressively worked to develop an anti-satellite capability. 29 In 1985, the Soviets were the only country to have a deployed capability to attack satellites in near-earth orbit and were working on satellite jammers, high-energy lasers, and antiballistic missiles with direct ascent ASAT capabilities. 30 Today, Moscow advocates limiting these weapons and have ceased testing them publicly. 31 However, US fielding of a counterspace communications system and an anti-ballistic missile system may provide the catalyst to change
Moscow's position.
China also presents a potential threat to US space forces as senior Chinese military officials openly advocate the importance of developing the capability to counter US dominance in space. 32 Hui Zhang, a Chinese nuclear policy and space weaponization expert, expressed
China's fear of US space superiority and stated:
Given the inherent vulnerability of space-based weapons systems to more costeffective anti-satellite (ASAT) attacks, China could resort to ASAT weapons as an asymmetrical (defense) measure. 33 Zhang also implied that China would only adopt these counter-measures if the US pushed ahead with its own missile defense and space weaponization plans first. 34 There are some indications that Bejing is pushing ahead with space ASAT research. Terrorists around the world are not aiming their actions at our military alone. … Our enemies can bring crippling destruction to our nation in a matter of days, or even hours, and our space capabilities are not immune to attack. 38 Other experts have discussed the possibility of terrorist attacks focused at disrupting space-based services and degrading capabilities 39 to include the possibility of a rogue state or terrorist group detonating a nuclear weapon in low-Earth orbit (LEO) 40 destroying or degrading most commercial satellites in LEO that are not hardened against nuclear effects.
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Some policy experts dismiss the threat to US space systems as more paranoia than reality. 42 However, the US dependence on space for its national security coupled with the inherent vulnerability of space systems to attack demands the US develop the capability to detect the testing, development and employment of ASAT weapons to either deter their development and use or develop an effective counter. 43 The fielding of a robust space threat warning system is essential to detecting and deterring future hostile space weapons development.
Implications of the Erosion of US Space Threat Warning Capability
The erosion of the US ability to execute the space threat warning mission has serious implications for US national security to include: the loss of a key early warning indicator of an attack on the US homeland; the loss of space capabilities which would degrade US warfighting effectiveness; the preventable loss of critical high-value satellites, facilities or services; the increased possibility that adversaries could develop new weapons or covertly conduct probing attacks on US space systems; and the lack of a credible means to execute stated US policy in response to an attack against space assets.
One of the most serious impacts of the failure to develop or execute a reliable space threat warning and attack verification system is the loss of a key early warning indicator of an attack on the US homeland or an attack that is part of a major regional action by a near-peer adversary such as an attack on Taiwan by the Chinese mainland. The Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, whose goal was the destruction of the Pacific Fleet, was not done as an isolated act, but as part of the start of a larger campaign to establish a Japanese Pacific sphere of influence which included the forceful acquisition of US territories. At this time, the Pacific Fleet was viewed as a US center of gravity whose destruction would enable Japan to achieve regional domination and discourage future US intervention. Today, our space-based assets may represent the equivalent of the WWII Pacific Fleet. Further, other nations have stated they view the US reliance on space as a potential Achilles' Heel and a center of gravity whose destruction or disruption is critical to future military success against the US.
44
Although a major attack on the US is not likely, the loss of US space-based early warning capability and ground-based missile warning radars could undermine nuclear deterrence strategy resulting in a devastating miscalculation that the US was vulnerable to a nuclear first strike. The perception that US space capabilities are vulnerable to a surprise attack also weakens conventional deterrence. In the case of a US-China conflict over Taiwan, the Chinese might seek to disrupt or destroy regional space capabilities as part of a delaying strategy to deny US forces access to the region until their military operations were well underway, making the Chinese takeover of Taiwan a fait accompli.
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A successful Pearl Harbor-type attack on US space assets would degrade US fighting effectiveness. Today, space represents the ultimate high ground and it is unlikely that a nation whose military ambitions might provoke US involvement, will willingly cede that high ground.
The level of battlespace awareness space-based platforms provide makes any attack using large massed forces difficult to accomplish. The ability to neutralize these platforms would improve the circumstances required to gain a strategic advantage over US and allied forces.
As General Lord stated in his Congressional testimony: "A resourceful enemy will look at our centers of gravity and try to attack them. Our adversaries understand our global dependence on space capabilities, and we must be ready to handle any threat to our space infrastructure." 46 With the increased US reliance on space assets for communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and command and control of our deployed forces; a successful space attack could significantly delay US response to regional aggression.
During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), over 60% of theater communications traveled via satellites. 47 The Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS) provided 90% of all protected communications and 70% of all military satellite communications into theater. 48 These capabilities significantly enhanced command and control of US and allied forces. Further, the employment of the satellite-based Blue Force Tracker system resulted in an unprecedented level of situational awareness which decreased fratricide and facilitating search and rescue operations and reinforcement operations. 49 The United States also maximized the use of the space-based Global Positioning System (GPS) to enable precision weapons delivery, allowing the use of fewer and smaller weapons to achieve effects; to enhance navigation in featureless terrain; and to aid in the location of both friendly and hostile forces. 50 General Lord testified to Congress: "Space capabilities are no longer nice to have, but are now indispensable to how we fight and win our nation's wars." 51 The failure to develop a credible space threat warning system increases the likelihood that a foreign nation would attack US space assets.
The inability to detect and provide timely warning of a space attack could result in the preventable loss of critical high-value satellites, facilities or services. There are a number of scenarios where the timely detection of a threat would allow space operators to intervene, thwarting the attack. In many instances, the ability to find, fix, target and destroy the threat is currently a viable way to counter the attack. However, this is not always possible. In the case of a co-orbital ASAT attack, which involves the launch and maneuver of a satellite into a closing orbit of another satellite to destroy or disrupt it, the countermeasure require a pre-intercept maneuver of the target satellite. The support countermeasures for an attack on space ground facilities include increased physical and information security. Countermeasures for electronic warfare attacks or jamming of the space link segment exist but there is often a significant bandwidth cost when these measures are in effect. 52 Degradations to space assets could also occur as a result of unintentional sources such as radio frequency interference or from scientific research such as laser research. In these situations, it is important to locate the source and terminate the activity to prevent loss of the space asset or service. The loss of these capabilities during critical operations could result in operational failure, loss of equipment, resources, and lives.
The inability to rapidly neutralize sources of satellite communication (SATCOM) interference also has national security implications. In the area of airpower employment, successful SATCOM jamming could disrupt the US ability to command and control air assets in theater from geographically separated air operations centers. A delay of even one to two days might jeopardize US ability to support deployed forces. Satellite communication links to worldwide deployed forces are critical capabilities in protecting US security, sovereignty, and military combat capability.
The inability to detect and assess space threats might allow adversaries to develop new weapon systems or conduct probing attacks on US space systems without our knowledge.
Although US surveillance technology and systems are more sophisticated today, the US should not assume it will always be able to detect the development of a new weapon. Our experience in post-WW II with the Germans is one example. After the defeat of Nazi Germany, the US and Russia engaged in a race to uncover Germany's scientific secrets. Major General Hugh-Knerr, deputy commander of the US Air Forces in Europe wrote: "The occupation of German scientific and industrial establishments has revealed the fact that we have been alarmingly backward in many fields of research." 53 Supersonic rockets, nerve gas, jet aircraft, guided missiles, stealth technology and hardened armor were just some of the technologies developed in WWII German laboratories. 54 The Soviet Sputnik launches and the deployment of the FOB system are modern examples of technological surprise. 55 Today, other nations are working to develop new weapons to counter US dominance and to take the lead in what is termed Fourth Generation Warfare-information war. The current coverage gaps in our space surveillance network, a fragmented intelligence network, a lack of discipline in anomaly reporting, the current inability to rapidly detect an attack on on-orbit systems, and overall erosion over the last decade of the space defense mindset makes it more likely an adversary could develop anti-satellite weapons without our knowledge.
Finally, without a credible space threat warning capability the US will not have the ability to execute stated US policy to counter an attack against US space assets. In 1999, President Clinton signed into law DoD Directive 3100.10, US Space Policy, which specifically declared an attack on US space systems, to include commercial space systems, an attack on US sovereignty. 56 One purposes of this policy is to deter an attack on US space assets. However, the lack of a credible space threat warning system undermines this policy. A senior officer in US Strategic
Command recently stated that a nation or group could likely interfere with US satellites without fear of retribution.
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These implications point to the need to ensure the US can rapidly detect, warn and respond to a hostile threat space systems. In the near term there is no way the DoD can address all the deficiencies with the current budget. However, there are a number of actions that the DoD, USSTRATCOM, the service components can take that do not require extensive funding.
The final section identifies these recommendations.
Recommendations and Conclusion
Increased funding for space control is on the way for the space situational awareness Commander; (2) USSTRATCOM should initiate recurring end-to-end testing of the space threat warning and attack verification system that includes all space operators in the field and appropriate civilian agencies; and (3) USSTRATCOM should update directives that provide guidance on space threat events, assessment criteria, attack verification procedures, and specific guidance on the type, content and format of threat warning messages and the appropriate response across the command.
Establish the Global Space Defense Commander (GSDC) Position
The Air Force has made great strides in developing the command and control doctrine for 
Responsibility
Develop, integrate, and distribute a C/JFCapproved joint area air defense plan (AADP) with the support of service or functional components Develop, integrate, and distribute a CDRUSSTRATCOM-approved Global Space Defense Plan (GSDP) with the support of service or functional components Develop and execute a detailed plan to disseminate timely air and missile warning and cueing information to components, forces, allies, coalition partners, and civilian authorities IAW the joint force J-2, J-3,& J-6.
Develop and execute a detailed plan to disseminate timely space warning information to components, forces, allies, coalition partners, and civilian authorities as appropriate. Fragmented C2". 62 This ambiguity decreases the chances that space anomalies will get reported in a timely manner in order to build a common operating picture of the space environment. The GSDC will help rectify this by serving as the focal point to plan, coordinate, prioritize and conduct space defense operations and execute the responsibilities outlined in Table 1 .
Establish and Conduct Recurring End-to-End Space Threat Warning Exercises
USSTRATCOM should initiate recurring end-to-end testing of the space threat warning and attack verification system that includes space operators in the field from all services and appropriate civilian agencies. These end-to-end exercises would also include the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, the Joint Space Operations Center, the USSTRATCOM Global Operations Center, USSTRATCOM assessors and the National Military Command Center.
The exercises should include the range of space threats such as ground attack and sabotage of space ground stations; potential directed energy events both intentional and unintentional; electronic warfare and radio frequency interference; co-orbital ASATS; a direct ascent ASAT;
and high-altitude nuclear detonations in space. Exercise planners should also include events that cross-over geographic unified command and international boundaries such as a cruise missile attack against the Shemya Air Force Station radar or the radar at Vardo, Norway; or a space nuclear detonation over a broad ocean area. These type of events will help senior leaders work through space attack assessment and response policies before they actually occur. Recurring end-to-end exercises will enhance familiarity of the threat warning process from personnel in the field to senior leaders making final assessments and response recommendations. More importantly, these exercises will help identify problem areas for resolution and serve as an effective deterrent to convince adversaries that an attack against US space systems will be ineffective and will not significantly impair warfighting capabilities. However, this breakdown in the threat warning process delayed the release of information that, given a different space event, could have negated the ability to effectively respond to the threat.
Clearly, the time to learn how the space threat warning system works and to think through appropriate responses to an attack is not during a crisis. Current, published guidance integrated into the operational training of all space operators and operations center personnel would minimize the chance of this problem reoccurring.
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The growing dependence and vulnerability of US space capabilities to attack outweighs the absence of a hard demonstrated threat to space systems in the decision to make space defense and space threat warning a priority. Further, it is probably not in the best interest of future adversaries to develop space weapons capabilities openly that would prompt the US to develop an effective counter. The United States needs to stay ahead of any future adversary to protect space assets which are critical economic and military force multipliers. However, as the US experienced in 1941 at Pearl Harbor, not all of our adversaries are going to forego an opportunity to exercise the element of surprise to gain operational success. A robust space threat warning capability will ensure future adversaries do not execute a successful space Pearl Harbor. 
